Firestone's Tire Recall - A History Of Tire Failure and Lawsuits
Bridgestone/Firestone has the dubious honor of being the tire maker with the three (and
possibly more looming) largest tire recalls in U.S. history. The first one in 1978 when 14
million tires were recalled due to sudden tread separations.
The next came in 2000 when ten million Wilderness A/T and ATX tires were recalled
due to sudden tread separations. Most recently, and the 3rd largest recall of a tire in U.S.
history, was for its Steeltex tires. Almost half a million were recalled in February of
2004 again, due to sudden tread separations. While the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) instigated this recall Bridgestone/Firestone has, ironically,
dubbed it a "voluntary customer satisfaction program." Following the February 2004
recall Bridgestone/Firestone spokesperson, Dan MacDonald, stated "We haven't
identified a specific problem with the tires." "The data suggested that there's an issue,
and the decision was made that instead of having a long drawn-out investigation to figure
out if there is a problem, let's just step up and replace the tires."
Deny and reflect seemed to be the tire-maker's defense during the lawsuits involving
Ford and Bridgestone/ Firestone regarding its Wilderness AT and ATX series tires.
These tires, prone to tread separation, were named co-culprit in the Ford Explorer roll
over accidents, which resulted in the death of at least 271 people. In addition to the
recall, Ford, in an effort to protect its own name, footed the bill for an additional 18
million Wilderness tires to be replaced.
In November 2001 Bridgestone/Firestone agreed to a $41.5 million settlement under
which each of the states, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were to receive
$500,000.00. Five million dollars was to be spent on consumer education and ten million
for attorney fees. In March of 2004 a Texas state judge approved a $149 million
settlement to resolve 30 class action lawsuits against Bridgestone/Firestone in connection
with their Wilderness tires. It is estimated through the March 2004 settlement
Bridgestone/Firestone spent $1.5 billion on recall Wilderness related costs, including
lawsuits.
It was determined that the manufacturing process used for the Wilderness tires was to
blame for the tire defects. This process used at its Decatur, Illinois plant (closed as a
result of the Wilderness problems), utilized a process known as pelletizing. During this
process rubber pellets are blended with a lubricant to create the rubber skim coat on steel
belted tires. Other tire plants use rubber slabs which do not require as much lubricant.
Bridgestone/Firestone found that the lubricant can cause a tire to breakdown.
According to NHTSA spokesperson, Rae Tyson, the agency has received more than
1,000 complaints about Steeltex tires, including reports of 58 injuries and 13 deaths. The
agency; however, backs up Bridgestone/Firestone's claims that Steeltex tires are not
defective and has declined to reopen an investigation as requested by California law firm
Lisoni & Lisoni.
On August 12, 2002, the California law firm, Lisoni & Lisoni in connection with the law
firm of Steven Weinberger, filed a national class action suit, in state court, titled, Roger
Littell, Lou Ann Pleasant v. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone Corporation, Case
No. INC 030708, before Superior Court Judge, Christopher J. Sheldon. In their
Complaint they allege a defect in the Steeltex model tire, similar to that of the Wilderness
model, and seek to recall 27.5 million tires.
According to Lisoni, on their website, www.firestonesteeltexclassaction.com, the goal is
to "bring about a nationwide recall of dangerous and defective Firestone Steeltex R4S,
R4SII, and A/T tires." Their suit alleges fraudulent concealment, unfair practices, and product liability.
In an April 24, 2003 hearing, Judge Christopher Sheldon upheld all five causes of action
(Fraudulent Concealment; Negligence; Strict Liability; Violation of California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act; Violation of California Unfair Business Practices Act) in the
lawsuit and denied the demurrer of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. seeking to dismiss the
national class action.
The Steeltex comes standard on 71 vehicles including ambulances, school buses, large
pickups, and recreational vehicles. The Steeltex tires for ambulances were manufactured
at the now defunct Decatur plant at the same time as the Wilderness and using the same
process.
Ambulances such as those in Bradley County, TN (near the Nashville based tire
manufacturer), which suffered two Steeltex blow outs within a few weeks, one while
transporting a patient. The agency decided to replace all of its Steeltex tires with another
brand. Lisoni has identified 175 ambulance services that have replaced Steeltex tires
with another brand after suffering tread separations and accidents. Various ambulance
companies in 36 states have decided to replace their Steeltex tires with competitors, at
their own cost.
Bridgestone/Firestone spokesperson, Dan MacDonald states the tire maker was not aware
of any "particular problems" with Steeltex tires on ambulances. MacDonald states that in
most cases the problems were with how the tires were maintained.
Lisoni & Lisoni further contend that the defective tires (including Wilderness, Steeltex,
Dueler, Firehawk and Potenza) are a result of a dramatic cost reduction plan
Bridgestone/Firestone implemented known as "C-95" The goal of C-95, according to a
memo from its then President was to reduce the cost of manufacturing their tires by 26%
over five consecutive years, in order to reduce two billion dollars in corporate debt.
Bridgestone/Firestone spokesman Dan MacDonald said the lawsuit is taking the memo
out of context that Bridgestone/Firestone, like most manufacturing companies, routinely
strives to find ways to improve productivity and lower costs as a way to remain
competitive.
The plaintiffs claim in order to reach this goal Bridgestone/Firestone "de-engineered"
their tires using "out of spec synthetic polymers," "reducing the natural rubber content in
tire compounds," "using reduced gauge calendared steel cord," "reducing tire inner-liner
gauge," "reducing the wedge gauge," "pre-assembly of the belt edge inserts to the body
ply," "reduction of the frequency of component testing of raw material & work-in-
process," and "increasing the age limits on all green components."
The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Class Certification on May 30, 2003. They have
been denied twice. Bridgestone Firestone asserts that they manufactured more than 100
different styles and that Lisoni failed to show it was reasonable to bring a single class-
action lawsuit against a tire that comes in more than 100 styles.
According to Vanderbilt University law professor, Richard Nagareds, the decision go
grant a class action has enormous implications. For the plaintiff's, he believes a class
action certification would mean that the company would more than likely settle the
lawsuit. For Bridgestone/Firestone, the decision not to certify the suit as a class action
would mean that each case would have to be handled separately in state courts. One of
the reasons Lisoni & Lisoni are seeking class action status is the hardship and
impracticality that would be imposed by forcing individual plaintiffs to file claims in
order to be properly reimbursed for replacing their Steeltex tires, Lisoni estimates that
class action certification would add five million plaintiffs to the suit.
Lisoni has not given up and on 1/18/06 filed Appellant's Reply Brief Appealing the
Order Denying Class Action Certification. The trial in the individual actions of Roger
Littell & Lou Ann Pleasant has been continued until October 23, 2006.
While Bridgestone/Firestone is not out of the Wilderness yet, additional suits may be
brewing regarding an unknown tire maker which according to the NHTSA had a higher
failure rate than the Steeltex tire; however, its information was confidential because this
brand was not even under investigation.
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